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Abstract: The paper develops a three-sector general equilibrium model with two informal sectors 
with complete mobility of labour between these sectors and with a positive relationship between wage 
income and labour's efficiency to show that the results relating to foreign capital inflow and removal 
of protectionism may be counterintuitive to the conventional wisdom. The paper is also devoted to 
explain why some developing countries implement tariff reforms very slowly compared to others, 
even after formally choosing free trade as their development strategies, in a more general fashion than 
the existing tariff-jumping theory.  
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REMOVAL  OF  PROTECTIONISM,  FOREIGN  INVESTMENT AND  
WELFARE  IN  A  MODEL  OF  INFORMAL  SECTOR 
 
1.  Introduction: 
 
Until recently, the less developed countries followed a stringent trade policy and adopted an inward-
oriented strategy, making use of discriminating policies like tariffs, quotas, restricting free inflow of 
foreign capital and import of commodities. Only since the conclusion of the multilateral agreement 
and the formation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the Uruguay round of discussions there 
have been revolutionary changes in liberalizing international trade across countries whether 
developed or developing.  Liberalization involves both inflow of foreign capital as well as reduction 
of protection of domestic industries and integrating the domestic market with the world market.  
 
It has been observed that some developing countries, notably the non-OECD countries, are relatively 
slow in carrying out tariff reforms compared to other countries, although they have opted for the 
policy of free trade as their development strategy and have been able to attract substantial amount of 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) during the last decade. The explanation is provided by the tariff-
jumping theory
1
 that suggests a positive correlation between the amount of FDI in a country and the 
tariff rate imposed by it. There is no doubt that the major driving force behind FDI by the 
multinational corporations (MNCs) in the developing countries is the higher rate of return on their 
capital in these countries vis-à-vis the international market. Countries with protected domestic 
markets are likely to attract foreign investment
2
, but only for the purpose of jumping the tariff walls 
and reaping a good harvest by serving their markets directly. On the contrary, reductions of import 
tariffs imply larger volumes of imports, lower rates of return to capital and smaller amounts of FDI in 
these countries. 
 
While many developing countries undertake tariff reforms slowly and yearn for foreign capital, the 
effects of inflow of foreign capital in such economies are, in general, discouraging according to both 
trade and development theorists. Brecher and Alejandro (1977) have analyzed the welfare effects of 
foreign capital inflow in a two-commodity, two-factor full employment model; and Khan (1982) has 
considered a mobile capital Harris-Todaro model with urban unemployment. The important result, 
common to both is the following: inflow of foreign capital with full repatriation of its earnings is 
necessarily immiserizing if the import-competing sector is capital-intensive and is protected by a 
tariff. However, in the absence of any tariff, foreign capital inflow with full repatriation of its 
earnings does not affect welfare. Here welfare is defined as a positive function of national income.  
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In the literature, the Brecher-Alejandro proposition has also been re-examined in terms of three-sector 
models. The third sector may either be a duty-free zone (DFZ) (sometimes called foreign enclave) as 
in the works of Beladi and Marjit  (1992a, 1992b) or it may be an urban informal sector as in the 
works of Grinols (1991) and Chandra and Khan (1993). Beladi and Marjit (1992a) have shown that 
with full repatriation of foreign capital income, growth in the foreign capital can lead to 
immiserization in the presence of tariff-distortion even if the foreign capital is employed in the export 
sector. This generalizes the main result in the existing literature, which primarily focuses on foreign 
capital movement in the protected sector of the economy. 
 
Thus according to the conventional view, inflow of foreign capital with full repatriation of foreign 
capital income and in the presence of tariff protection leads to deterioration in the welfare of a small 
open economy. This is based upon the presumption that it cuts back the volume of trade further for a 
small open economy and moves it further away from the free trade situation, which is the optimal 
policy. An increase in tariff protection of the import-competing sector is also welfare reducing for the 
same reason . 
  
However, Grinols (1991) in terms of a three-sector specific factor model with an urban informal 
sector and Harris-Todaro setting has questioned the validity of the Brecher-Alejandro proposition. In 
Grinols (1991) inflow of foreign capital in the presence of a capital intensive and tariff-protected 
import-competing sector is not necessarily immiserizing. This is because of an increase in the return 
to the sector specific input, which may outweigh the increased cost of tariff protection resulting from 
an expansion of the protected sector. Chandra and Khan (1993) have presented a paper on the three-
sector general equilibrium analysis, which offers a set of models based upon a few alternative 
concepts of the informal sector to investigate the desirability of inflow of foreign capital. They have 
found that the Brecher-Alejandro proposition holds in general if the urban sector (formal plus 
informal) is more capital intensive than the rural sector.  
 
Both Grinols (1991) and Chandra and Khan (1993) are based on the Harris-Todaro (1970) 
framework. Unfortunately, the labour allocation mechanism in a Harris-Todaro type model is not very 
realistic. Migration of workers from the rural to the urban sectors takes place so long as the expected 
urban wage rate, which is the weighted average of the urban formal and informal wage rates, is 
greater than the actual rural wage rate. If migration is cost-less, the informal wage rate lies below both 
the unionized wage rate of the formal sector and the rural sector wage rate in migration equilibrium. 
In a static model like this where migration involves no apparent costs and given the security of jobs of 
the workers employed in the formal sector owing to the presence of trade unions, there is no 
satisfactory answer to why some of those who are unable to find employment in the urban formal 
sector do not return to the rural sector and ultimately lead to the equalization of the wage rates   4 
between these two informal sectors. In other words, the lack of complete labour mobility between the 
two informal sectors of the economy is not tenable from a theoretical point of view. Secondly, like 
most of the static trade models the labour endowment is measured in physical units and therefore 
treated as exogenously given. Thus the role of the Wage Efficiency Hypothesis
3
, as developed by 
Leibenstein (1957), Mirrlees (1975) and Bliss and Stern (1978), in determining the labour endowment 
has been ignored. The basic idea of this hypothesis is that the efficiency of a worker is positively 
related to the wage rate he receives. In a developing economy where a lion's share of the total labour 
force lives below the poverty line one simply cannot leave out the possibility of the changes in 
labour's efficiency and hence in the labour endowment of the economy in efficiency unit owing to 
changes in wage incomes.  
 
The central objective of the present paper is two-fold. First, it shows that in a production structure 
appropriate for a developing economy there may be cases where one is able to derive results relating 
to foreign capital inflow and reduction in import tariff, which are counterintuitive to the conventional 
wisdom. We have developed a three-sector general equilibrium model with two informal sectors 
where there is complete mobility of labour between these two sectors and assumed a positive 
relationship between wage income and labour's efficiency. In this scenario, we explore the 
possibilities of welfare improvement with simultaneous increases in labour and capital endowments 
of the economy where the latter is caused by inflow of foreign capital while the former is the result of 
a consequent positive effect on labour's efficiency of an increase in the labour incomes arising from 
the reallocation of labour among the different sectors of the economy. We shall show that in the 
presence of labour market distortions, foreign capital inflow may be desirable both in the presence 
and absence of tariff protection due to its favourable impact on welfare. This result cannot be found in 
earlier papers in the Harris-Todaro framework with labour market distortions. Again, quite contrary to 
the popular belief that reduction of tariff leads to an increase in the volume of trade, thereby 
improving welfare, we have cited the possibility of welfare deterioration even with slashed tariff rate. 
Secondly, the paper is devoted to explain why some developing countries implement tariff reforms 
very slowly compared to others, even after formally choosing free trade as their development strategy 
in a more general fashion than the existing tariff-jumping theory. The tariff-jumping argument is valid 
only if foreign capital enters into the import-competing sector of the host country. On the contrary, 
the present paper shows that the positive correlation between tariff rates and foreign capital flows 
prevails even if foreign capital comes into the export sector of a developing economy. Moreover, the 
paper reveals that some countries may endeavour tariff reforms slowly not only because these deter 
inflow of foreign capital but also because tariff reductions may directly lead to deterioration of the 
welfare of these economies by lowering domestic factor incomes and thus reducing the efficiency of 
labour.                
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2.  The Model: 
 
We consider a small open economy, with three sectors − two informal and one formal where all the 
sectors operate at close vicinity. One of the two informal sectors (sector 1) produces an agricultural 
commodity using capital of type 1 and labour. The other informal sector (sector 2) produces a 
manufacturing product using capital of type 2 and labour. The formal sector also produces a 
manufacturing commodity with the help of capital of type 2 and labour. So capital of type 2 is mobile 
between the two manufacturing sectors and labour is mobile among all the three sectors. But capital 
of type 1 is specific to sector 1. Let us now assume that labour in the formal sector earns a contractual 
wage, W , while the wage rate in the two informal sectors, W, is market determined. Throughout the 
paper we shall assume that the formal manufacturing sector is more capital (of type 2) intensive than 
the informal manufacturing sector in value terms i.e.  3 K 2 L 2 K 3 L W W λ λ < λ λ , where   
λji is the proportion of the j
th factor employed in the i
th sector for j = L, K and i = 2, 3. Owing to our 
small open economy assumption we consider all the three product prices to be given internationally. 
We assume that the formal sector is the import-competing sector of the economy and is protected by a 
tariff. Production functions exhibit constant returns to scale with diminishing marginal productivity to 
each factor. The three inputs, labour and the two types of capital, are fully employed. The endowment 
of labor in physical units is given. The efficiency of the representative worker, h, is a positive 
function of his consumption. All the workers are assumed to possess identical efficiency functions. 
Thus, there is possibility of changes in labour endowment measured in efficiency units.  
 
The following symbols will be used in the formal presentation of the model: 
Li a  = labour-output ratio in the i
th sector, i = 1, 2, 3; 
Ki a =  capital-output ratio in the i
th sector, i = 1, 2, 3;  
i P  = world price of the i
th commodity, i = 1, 2, 3; 
t  = ad-valorem rate of tariff on the import of commodity 3; 
j r =  return to capital of type j, j = 1, 2; 
h = efficiency of the representative worker; 
W = wage rate (per efficiency unit) in the two informal sectors; 
W = institutionally given wage rate (per efficiency unit) in the formal sector; 
L = labour endowment in physical unit (normalized to unity); 
j K = stock of capital of type j, j = 1, 2; 
ji θ  = distributive share of the j
th input in the i
th industry;   6 
ji λ  = proportion of the j
th input employed in the i
th sector, i = 1, 2, 3; and, j = L, K1, K2; 
"^" = proportionate change.   
 
The general equilibrium is represented by the set of following equations.  
1 L a W +  1 K a 1 r  =  1 P                                       (1)        
2 L a W +  2 K a 2 r  =  2 P                                     (2)       
3 L a W  +  3 K a 2 r  =  3 P (1+t)                           (3)      
1 K a 1 X  =  1 K                                                   (4) 
2 K a 2 X  +  3 K a 3 X  =  2 K                              (5)  
 
Now assuming that the Wage Efficiency Hypothesis holds and after normalizing the labour 
endowment in physical unit to unity, we may write the efficiency of the representative worker, h, as a 
positive function of the average wage. Thus, 
h = h(w); 
' h > 0                                                                                          (6)  
where w is the average wage of the workers in the economy and is given by 
 ( 1 L a 1 X  +  2 L a 2 X ).W  +  3 L a 3 X W = w                                             (7) 
 
The reasons for h′(w) to be positive are explained as follows. Let us first assume that the consumption 
efficiency hypothesis of Leibenstein (1957) is valid. It states that the nutritional efficiency of the 
worker varies positively with his level of consumption. We assume all households to be identical so 
that the proportion of intersectoral labour allocation of each household will be identical to that of the 
entire economy. So the average wage rate of the workers in the economy is the same as the wage 
income per member in the representative household. We also assume that the representative 
household consumes its entire wage income and that consumption is equally distributed among its 
members. Then each worker consumes an amount equal to the average wage rate in the economy; and 
using the consumption efficiency hypothesis we can then explain the positive relationship between h 
and w. 
 
It should be noted that the validity of the consumption efficiency hypothesis is subject to a lot of 
criticisms. This is valid only when the level of consumption is very low. However, this hypothesis has 
been widely used in the theoretical literature on development economics.  
 
The full-employment of labour in efficiency unit implies the following. 
1 L a 1 X  +  2 L a 2 X  +  3 L a 3 X  = h(( 1 L a 1 X  +  2 L a 2 X )W +  3 L a 3 X W )                             (8)   7 
There are eight endogenous variables in the system: W,  1 r ,  2 r ,  1 X ,  2 X ,  3 X , h and w. The system 
possesses the decomposition property. So the factor prices are determined independently of the output 
system. As W is given,  2 r is found from equation (3). Given  2 r , equation (2) can be solved to get W. 
Once W is known, the equilibrium value of  1 r  is determined from (1). If factor prices are known the 
factor coefficients, aijs, are also known. Equations (4), (5) and (8) can be solved to get the product-
mix. The average wage, w is obtained from (7). Finally, the efficiency of each worker, h, is found 
from equation (6). 
 
Before going to comparative statics, it is important to mention that our measure of welfare in this 
small open economy is national income measured at world prices, Y, which is expressed as follows. 
Y = W. 3 3 L 2 2 L 1 1 L X a W ) X a X a ( + + 3 3 2 2 1 1 X tP K r K r − + +                                         (9) 
In equation (9),  ) ( 2 2 1 1 X a X a W L L + gives the total wage income in the two informal sectors of the 
economy. W 3 3X aL  is the amount of the wage income of the labourers employed in the formal 
sector.  1 1K r  and  2 2K r are the rental incomes from capital of types 1 and 2, respectively. Finally, 
3 3X tP measures the cost of tariff protection of the import-competing sector. It should be pointed 
out that even if one measures welfare using a quasi-concave social welfare function, which 




2.1   Effects of Foreign Capital Inflow and Tariff Reduction on Welfare 
 
According to the conventional wisdom inflow of foreign capital in a developing economy leads to 
deterioration in its welfare while a reduction in tariff protection is welfare improving. However, in 
this paper we are interested to reanalyze the impact of foreign capital inflow (of either type) and / or a 
reduction in import tariff on the welfare of a small open economy in the presence of perfect labour 
mobility between the two informal sectors and endogenous determination of labour efficiency. 
 
Total differentials of (1), (2) and (3) and use of envelope conditions yield 
1 L θ W ˆ  +  1 K θ 1 ˆ r  = 0                                     (1.1) 
2 L θ W ˆ  +  2 K θ 2 ˆ r  = 0                                    (2.1)  
3 K θ 2 ˆ r  = Ttˆ                                                  (3.1)     
where T = (t/1+t). From (3.1), (2.1) and (1.1) it respectively follows that   8 
2 ˆ r  = Ttˆ/ 3 K θ ;  
W ˆ  = − (T 2 K θ / 2 L θ 3 K θ )tˆ; and,                                                   (10) 
1 ˆ r  = (T 1 L θ 2 K θ / 1 K θ 2 L θ 3 K θ )t ˆ                   
 
From (10) it follows that  2 ˆ r ,  1 ˆ r  <  0 if t ˆ < 0. So a reduction of import tariff lowers the rates of return 
of both types of capital. If inflow of foreign capital and the rate of return on capital in the host country 
are related positively the following proposition follows immediately. 
  
PROPOSITION 1: Tariff reforms may act as deterrent to foreign capital inflow either when it enters 
into the import-competing sector or into the export sector of a developing economy.        
 
It should be noted that in the present paper a positive correlation between inflow of foreign capital 
and tariff rate holds even if foreign capital enters into the export sector of a developing economy. The 
existing tariff-jumping theory fails to explain the relationship in this situation.                          
 
To derive the effects of foreign capital inflow and tariff reforms on the output composition, after 
differentiating equation (5) and using (10) one can obtain
4
 the following expression. 
2 K λ 2 ˆ X  +  3 K λ 3 ˆ X  = T ( 2 K λ 2 σ  +  3 K λ 3 L θ 3 σ )t ˆ/ 3 K θ  +  2 ˆ K                              (11) 





2 L X ˆ ) Wh 1 ( − λ 3
'
3 L X ˆ ) h W 1 ( − λ +  
       ) / ( 3 2 2 K L K T θ θ θ − = [(( ) 1 )( ) /
'
2 2 1 1 1 Wh L K L − + σ λ θ σ λ ) ( W h 2 L 1 L
' λ + λ +  
           ) / ( ) h W 1 ( 2 K 3 K 2 L 3
'
3 L θ θ θ σ − λ + ].t ˆ
1
'
1 L K ˆ ) Wh 1 ( − λ −                                   (12) 
 
Solving (11) and (12) by Cramer's rule one gets the following
6
. 






1 L 3 K K ˆ ) 1 Wh ( − λ λ 2 3 L
' K ˆ ) h W 1 ( λ − − 3 L 3 K B A { λ + λ − ( t ˆ )} h W 1
' − ]        (13)   
and, 




[(1-W 2 2 L
' K ˆ ) h λ 1
') 1 ( L Wh λ − + 1 2 K K ˆ λ t ˆ } A ) Wh 1 ( B { 2 K
'
2 L λ + − λ + ]          (14) 
where, A =  ) / T ( 3 K 2 L 2 K θ θ θ [( ) Wh 1 )( /
'
2 2 L 1 K 1 1 L − σ λ + θ σ λ ) ( W h 2 L 1 L
' λ + λ +  
                     ) / ( ) h W 1 ( 2 K 3 K 2 L 3
'
3 L θ θ θ σ − λ + ];   9 
B = ( ) )( / T 3 3 L 3 K 2 2 K 3 K σ θ λ + σ λ θ  >  0; and, 
h λ = (1 − W 2 K 3 L
'
3 K 2 L
' ) h W 1 ( ) h λ λ − − λ λ                                                   (15) 
 
We now state and prove the following proposition. 
 
PROPOSITION 2: There is possibility of welfare improvement owing to foreign capital inflow in 
either of the two broad sectors of the economy in the presence of tariff if W
' h ≥ 1 and  h λ  > 0. In 
the absence of tariff, foreign capital is welfare improving iff  h λ > 0. 
 
Proof:  Suppose that foreign capital flows to the informal agricultural sector. Thus  1 K  increases with 
2 K  and t remaining unchanged, i.e.  1 K ˆ  > 0 and  0 t ˆ K ˆ
2 = = . 
Differentiating (9) with respect to  1 K  one can obtain the following expression
7
. 
(dY/dK1) =  (h.λL1.λL3.λK2 /λh.K1).( ) W W −  − (tP3.X3 /K1.λh) 1
') 1 .( L Wh λ − 2 K λ           (16)            
Now since  W W > , (d 1 3 dK / X ) < 0 and (dY/d 1 K )  > 0 if (i) W
' h ≥ 1 and (ii)  h λ > 0. Note that 
iff  h λ > 0, (dY/d 1 K )  > 0 even in the absence of tariff protection. 
 
Let us now consider the case where owing to foreign capital inflow  2 K  increases but  1 K  and t 
remain unchanged. i.e.  2 K ˆ > 0,  . 0 t ˆ K ˆ
1 = =  
Differentiating (9) with respect to  2 K  we can derive the following. 
(dY/d 2 K ) = W ) dK / dX ( a 2 2 2 L ) dK / dX ( a W 2 3 3 L + ) dK / dX ( tP 2 3 3 −  
 
With the help of  (13) and (14) it may be rewritten as 
(dY/d 2 K ) = W ) 1 (
'
2 h W aL − .(λL3.X2 /λh.K2)  ) 1 (
'
3 Wh a W L − + (λL2.X3 /λh.K2) 
                                                                                        −  (tP3.X3 /K2.λh).(1 − Wh′).λL2  
              = (λL2.λL3.h /λh.K2).( W ) W − − (tP3.X3 /K2.λh).(1 − Wh′).λL2                        (17)                
Here also (dY/d 2 K )  > 0 if  (i) W
' h ≥ 1 and (ii)  h λ > 0.  Again (dY/d 2 K ) > 0 even in the absence 
of tariff protection iff  h λ > 0. Q.E.D. 
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Both equations (16) and (17) can be interpreted in terms of the labour-reallocation effect and the 
output (of the formal sector) effect. Owing to foreign capital inflow of either type, labour reallocation 
among the three sectors of the economy takes place affecting the average wage income of the 
workers. For example if the highest wage-paying formal sector expands at the cost of a lower wage-
paying informal sector, the average wage income of the workers, which also happens to be their 
aggregate wage income (as the labour endowment in physical unit has been normalized to unity) 
increases and as a consequence the welfare of the economy measured by the national income at world 
prices also goes up. This may be called the labour-reallocation effect, which is captured by the first 
term in the right-hand side of either (16) or (17). Again, inflow of foreign capital of either type 
produces a change in the output composition of the economy. As the import-competing formal sector 
is protected by a tariff its expansion or reduction also raises or lowers the distortionary costs of 
protection and hence the welfare. We may call it the output (of the formal sector) effect and is 
captured by the second term in the right-hand side of each (16) and (17).  
 
Let us now interpret the two sufficient conditions under which (dY/dK1) and (dY/dK2) are positive. 
As the efficiency of each worker, h, is a positive function of the average wage income of the workers, 
w, an increase in employment of labour (in efficiency unit) in any sector given the employment levels 
in other sectors raises aggregate and hence average wage income of the workers, which in turn leads 
to an increase in labour endowment in efficiency unit. For example, if one additional efficiency unit 
of the labour input is employed in sector 2, the average wage rate, w, increases by W that in turn 
raises the labour endowment (in efficiency unit) by the amount, h′.W. Thus instead of one unit, the 
availability of labour to the other two sectors actually decreases by only (1 − h′.W) efficiency unit. 
Now if h′.W > (=) 1, (1− h′.W) < (=) 0. In other words, h′.W  > (=) 1 implies that the employment of 
labour by one additional efficiency unit in sector 2 (or in sector 1) raises (leaves unchanged) the 
availability of labour (in efficiency unit) to the rest of the economy. 
 
On the other hand, λh = (1 − W.h′).λL2.λK3  − (1 −W .h′).λL3.λK2  >  0  implies  that                            
[λK3 /(1 −W .h′).λL3]  >  [λK2 / (1 − W.h′).λL2] i.e. the formal manufacturing sector (i.e. sector 3) is 
more capital-intensive vis-à-vis the informal manufacturing sector (i.e. sector 2) even when the effect 
of changes in average wage income on the labour endowment (in efficiency unit) is taken into 
account. 
 
Now depending upon the different values of W.h′ and W .h′ one can conceive of the following three 
cases.   11 
Case I: W .h′ > W.h′ > 1 and λh > 0 holds. In this case from (14) it follows that  3 ˆ X < 0 when  1 ˆ K , 
2 ˆ K > 0. Then from (16) and (17), (dY/dK1), (dY/dK2) > 0 trivially follow.  
Case II: W .h′ > 1 > W.h′. It means that (1 − W .h′) < 0 < (1 − W.h′). Soλh > 0 and  3 ˆ X > 0. 
However, (dY/dK1) and (dY/dK2) can be still positive if the labour reallocation effects are stronger 
than the respective output effects (of the formal sector). 
Case III:  1 > W .h′ > W.h′. Thus 0 < (1 − W .h′) < (1 − W.h′). As sector 3 is more capital intensive 
than sector 2, we have λh > 0. From (14) it then follows that  3 ˆ X > 0 when  1 ˆ K ,  2 ˆ K > 0. In this 
case also (dY/dK1) and (dY/dK2) can be positive. 
 
Proposition 2 can be intuitively explained as follows. Since the system possesses the decomposition 
property factor prices and hence factor coefficient remain unaltered owing to foreign capital inflow of 
either type. Thus if foreign capital is of type 1 the informal agricultural sector (sector 1) expands. This 
requires more labour, which is to be released by the other sectors. Now as the informal manufacturing 
sector (sector 2) is more labour intensive than the formal manufacturing sector (sector 3) with respect 
to capital of type 2, the latter expands while the former contracts due to Rybczynski effect. On the 
contrary, if foreign capital is of type 2, owing to foreign capital inflow the formal sector expands and 
the informal manufacturing sector contracts. As W >  W owing to reallocation of labour among 
different sectors, the average wage income rises which in turn raises the efficiency of the workers and 
hence the labour endowment of the economy in efficiency unit. This produces another Rybczynski 
effect, which works in the opposite direction of the previous one. The net effect would be a 
contraction of the formal sector if (i) W
' h > 1 and (ii)  h λ > 0. This would produce a favourable 
effect on the welfare since the volumes of trade would now be higher and hence the protectionary cost 
of tariff would be lower. There would be another positive effect on the economy's welfare due to an 
increase in aggregate wage income that results from a reallocation of labour among the different 
sectors of the economy. The latter effect would exist because of the presence of imperfections in the 
labour market for the formal sector. 
 
Thus in the presence of imperfections in the formal sector labor market, foreign capital inflow in 
either of the two broad sectors of the economy is welfare improving even in the absence of any 
protectionary policy, which is the consequence of reallocation of employment among the different 
sectors of the economy.  One cannot obtain such a result in a Harris-Todaro type of model despite the 
presence of imperfections in the labour market for the formal manufacturing sector. This is due to an 
interesting property implied by the Harris-Todaro labour migration framework. In such a framework 
the average wage of the workers in the economy is the rural wage rate and hence there does not exist   12 
any possibility of an increase in the total wage income resulting from any reallocation of employment 
unless the rural wage rate rises. Beladi, Marjit and Frasca (1998) have discussed this point in details 
in the context of analyzing the impact of inflow of foreign capital on national income in a small open 
economy.  
 
A pertinent question in this context is which type of capital (type 1 or type 2) is more desirable to 
make foreign direct investment improve welfare. To provide an answer to this question after 
subtracting (17) from (16) we get the following expression. 
 
[(dY/dK1) − (dY/dK2)] = [h.λL3.(W  − W)/λh].[(λL1.λK2 /K1) − (λL2 /K2)] − tP3.[(dX3/dK1 − 
                                                                                                                                            (dX3/dK2)] 
Using (14) it can be easily rewritten as 
[(dY/dK1) − (dY/dK2)] = [h.λL3.(W  − W)/λh].[(λL1.λK2 /λK1.K1) − (λL2/K2)]  
                                         − [tP3.(1 − Wh′)/λh].[(λL1.λK2/K1) − (λL2/K2)]         (note that λK1 = 1) 
                         = [λL2 /K1.λh].[h.λL3.(W − W) − tP3.X3.(1 − Wh′)].[{(λK2/λL2)/(λK1/λL1)}   
                                                                                           −  (K1/K2)]                             (18) 
From (18) it follows that (dY/dK1) > (dY/dK2) if (i) λh >  0 ;  ( i i )  W . h ′  ≤ 1; and, (iii) 




PROPOSITION 3: For improving the welfare of the economy inflow of foreign capital of type 1 is 
preferable to inflow of capital of type 2 if (i) λh > 0; (ii) W.h′ ≤ 1; and, (iii) {(λK2 /λL2)/(λK1 /λL1)} > 
(K1 /K2). 
 
According to proposition 3 under the above three sufficient conditions inflow of foreign capital into 
the export sector of the economy is more desirable compared to the alternative situation where it 
flows into the two manufacturing sectors including the import-competing sector. 
 
We are now interested to analyze the effect of tariff reduction on the import of the formal sector's 
product upon the welfare of the economy. Totally differentiating equation (9) and after using (4), 
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Y.Y ˆ =  (h.T.t ˆ/θL2.θK3.θK1).[W.θK2.{λL1.(σ1 − θK1) + λL2.θK1.(σ2 − 1)} + W .λL3.σ3.θL2.θK3.θK1] 
                           + (T/θK3).[(r1.K1.θL1.θK2/θK1.θL2) + r2.K2].t ˆ  
             + t ˆ.(h /λh)[B.λL2.{λL3.(W − W) − (tP3.X3/h).(1−Wh′)} + A.{λK2.(W .λL3 − (tP3X3/h))  
                                                                                     − W.λL2.λK3} – (tP3X3.λh/h)]              (19) 
From (19) it is evident that 
Y ˆ  <  0 when t ˆ < 0 under the following sufficient conditions: 
(i) C ≥ 0, where C = [W.θK2.{λL1.(σ1 − θK1) + λL2.θK1.(σ2 − 1)} + W .λL3.σ3.θL2.θK3.θK1] 
(ii) λh >  0; and, 
(iii) D ≥ 0, where D = [B.λL2.{λL3.(W − W) − (tP3.X3/h).(1−Wh′)} + A.{λK2.(W .λL3 − (tP3X3/h))  
                                                                             − W.λL2.λK3} – (tP3X3.λh/h)]                                      
So we can now establish the following proposition. 
 
PROPOSITION 4: Reduction of tariff protection may have an adverse impact on welfare if (i) C ≥ 0, 
(ii) λh > 0; and  (iii) D ≥ 0.  
 
We should note that if the production functions of sectors 1 and 2 are of the Cobb-Douglas type 
condition (i) stated in proposition 4 is automatically satisfied as σ1, σ2 = 1. In that case Y ˆ  < 0 when 
t ˆ < 0 if (i) λh > 0; and, (ii) D ≥ 0. So we have the following corollary.  
 
COROLLARY 1: If the production functions of sectors 1 and 2 are of the Cobb-Douglas type, 
Proposition 4 holds if (i) λh > 0; and if (ii) D ≥ 0.  
 
Proposition 4 may be explained as follows. A reduction of import tariff, t, affects the welfare of the 
economy by affecting the aggregate factor income and the cost of tariff protection of the import-
competing sector. As t is lowered, the rate of return on capital of type 2, r2 falls, which in turn raises 
the informal sector wage rate, W , to satisfy the zero profitability condition in sector 2. As W rises 
the rate of return on capital of type 1,  1 r , falls. The wage-rental ratios in all the three sectors rise 
forcing the producers to adopt more capital-intensive techniques of production. As sector 1 uses a   14 
specific factor an increase in  1 K a implies a fall in 1 X . On the other hand, sectors 2 and 3 both use 
capital of type 2. Given  2 X and  3 X adoption of more capital intensive techniques means a shortage 
of capital of type 2 leading to a contraction of sector 3 and an expansion of sector 2 as sector                                              
3 is more capital intensive vis-à-vis sector 2 in value terms. As the labour-output ratios in all these 
three sectors fall both sectors 1 and 3 would employ less labour (in efficiency unit) while sector 2 will 
now use more than before. However, the two informal sectors together would now absorb more 
labour. As the formal sector wage rate,W , is greater than the informal sector wage rate, W, total 
wage income of the workers would have surely fallen if W were unchanged. But as W has increased it 
may go in either way. However, total wage income would still fall under the sufficient conditions: (i) 
C ≥ 0; (ii) λh > 0; (iii) E ≥ 0 where E = [λL3.λL2.B.(W − W) + A. (W .λL3.λK2 − W.λL2.λK3)]; and, 
(iv) either C or E is non-zero. Aggregate rental income on capital unambiguously falls as rates of 
return on both types of capital fall. On the contrary, if the formal sector contracts the cost of tariff 
protection falls, which works favourably on welfare. However, the net effect of all the above factors 
would be a deterioration in welfare under the sufficient conditions: (i) C ≥ 0; (ii) λh > 0; and, (iii) 
D ≥ 0. 
 
Combining propositions 2 and 4 we may write the following proposition.  
PROPOSITION 5: Sufficient foreign investments are necessary along with reduction in tariff rates 
for welfare improvement. 
 
It follows from proposition 4 that a slash in the tariff rate may have adverse welfare effects. However, 
even with no tariff protection, foreign capital inflow may improve welfare as shown in proposition 2. 
Hence if an economy strives for liberalization by opening up avenues conducive to freer international 
trade, withdrawal of protection is an effective policy, provided it is supplemented by a massive 
foreign investment to overcome the bottlenecks of the inefficient and vulnerable unprotected firms. 
 
3.  Concluding  Remarks: 
 
Developing countries have been vigorously implementing trade liberalization policies for the last 
decade and a half. However, many developing countries are implementing their tariff reforms at 
slower rates than the average rate, although these are successful in attracting substantial amount of 
foreign direct investment (FDI). The present paper provides explanation as to why they are walking 
behind others with respect to the pace of tariff reforms, more satisfactorily than the existing tariff-
jumping theory. It shows that foreign capital inflow may be desirable from the welfare perspective of 
the developing countries if there exist two distortions rather than one in the markets: a commodity 
market distortion in the form of tariff and a labour market distortion in the form of unionized wage,   15 
and also if the efficiency of labour is positively related to the average wage in the economy. Besides, 
the paper has pointed out that a reduction of tariff may act as deterrent to FDI even if it flows into the 
export sector of the economy. Moreover, tariff reduction also lowers welfare directly by reducing the 
rental income from domestic capital stock as well as the labour income through reallocation of labour 
among the different sectors of the economy. 
  
However, we need not be too much worried about the static effects of implementing free trade, which 
are likely to prove costly for the developing countries. In the absence of protection, the inefficiency of 
the inward-oriented firms will be exposed, and their survival will be difficult unless they adjust 
radically to the new environment. However, they expect to benefit from the new opportunities 
generated by the dynamic effects of free trade. Indeed, estimates indicate that further reforms coupled 
with more domestic and foreign investment could make the benefits of free trade outweigh its costs 
and actually increase welfare. Lifting protection is expected to make firms behave more efficiently 
and adapt to international requirements. The dampening effects of removal of protectionism on FDI 
can be overcome by other liberalization policies like simplification of repatriations laws, reduction of 
obligatory export requirements, opening up of hitherto unexposed sectors to the MNCs etc. These 
policies, if successfully undertaken, are expected to stimulate FDI, which is crucial. FDI in the export 
sector shoots up exports and in the import-competing sector reduces total imports. Expansion of the 
export sector is expected to increase employment, since in the LDCs this sector is generally the more 
labour-intensive one. The end result will depend on the net outcome of destruction and creation 




1  See for example, Massimo (1992) and Noriyuki (1990) for details. 
2  Although the supply of foreign capital in an economy is positively related to the rate of return on 
capital in the host country the actual amount of foreign capital that is allowed to go into a 
developing economy in many cases is directly regulated by its government. In the process of 
liberalization the governments of these countries are allowing more and more foreign capital to 
enter into their economies. See Marjit (1994) in this context. 
3  In a static general equilibrium model like this the application of the Wage Efficiency Hypothesis 
(WEH), one may think, is somewhat restrictive since it assumes an instantaneous relationship 
between the wage income (and hence consumption) and the worker's efficiency. It is more 
plausible to consider that the level of consumption of a worker in a particular period influences 
his nutritional efficiency more in the future than in the current period. However, the existing 
literature (see for example, Mirrlees (1975), Stiglitz (1976), Bliss and Stern (1978), Dasgupta and 
Ray (1986)) on WEH considers a one-period world and hence assumes an instantaneous   16 
adjustment between the level of consumption of the worker and his efficiency. Besides, in a 
developing economy where the majority of the labour force lives below the poverty line and 
earns wage income less than or just equal to the subsistence level, there must be some impacts of 
changes in labour incomes on their efficiency even in the same period.  
4  See appendix I for detailed derivations. 
5  For detailed derivation see appendix I. 
6  This has been derived in appendix I. 
7  This has been derived in details in appendix II. 
8  This proposition has been developed following the suggestions of the anonymous referee of this 
journal to whom we are grateful. 
9  For detailed derivation see appendix III. 
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Differentiating (4) one gets 
1 ˆ X  = −  1 ˆK a  +  1 ˆ K  = − 1 L θ 1 σ (W ˆ − 1 ˆ r ) +  1 ˆ K  
or,  1 ˆ X  = ( 1 L θ ` 1 σ T 2 K θ / 1 K θ 2 L θ 3 K θ )t ˆ + 1 ˆ K                                     (A.1) 
Differentiation of (5) gives 
2 K λ 2 ˆ X  +  3 K λ 3 ˆ X  = − 2 K λ 2 ˆK a  −  3 K λ 3 ˆK a  +  2 ˆ K  
                                                          = − 2 K λ 2 L θ 2 σ (W ˆ −  2 ˆ r ) +  3 K λ 3 L θ 3 σ 2 ˆ r  +  2 ˆ K  
                                                                           
Use of (10) yields 
2 K λ 2 ˆ X  +  3 K λ 3 ˆ X  = T ( 2 K λ 2 σ  +  3 K λ 3 L θ 3 σ )t ˆ/ 3 K θ  +  2 ˆ K                                    (11) 
 
 
Differentiation of (8) gives  
1 L λ   1 ˆ X  +  2 L λ 2 ˆ X  +  3 L λ 3 ˆ X  = − 1 L λ 1 ˆL a  −  2 L λ 2 ˆl a −  3 L λ 3 ˆL a  + 
' h [W 1 L λ ( 1 ˆ X  +  1 ˆL a  + W ˆ ) 
                                                        + W ) X ˆ a ˆ W ˆ ( 2 2 L 2 L + + λ + )] X ˆ a ˆ ( W 3 3 L 3 L + λ    17 
or,λL1 ) Wh 1 ( X ˆ '
1 − ) Wh 1 ( X ˆ '
2 2 L − λ + ) h W 1 ( X ˆ '
3 3 L − λ +  
) Wh 1 ( a ˆ
'
1 L 1 L − λ − = ) Wh 1 ( a ˆ
'
2 L 2 L − λ − ) h W 1 ( a ˆ
'
3 L 3 L − λ − ) ( W ˆ W h 2 L 1 L
' λ + λ +  
) Wh 1 (
'
1 L − λ = ) r ˆ W ˆ ( 1 1 K 1 − θ σ ) r ˆ W ˆ ( ) Wh 1 ( 2 2 K 2
'
2 L − θ σ − λ + 2 3 K 3
'
3 L r ˆ ) h W 1 ( θ σ − λ −  
      ) ( W ˆ W h 2 L 1 L
' λ + λ +  
t ˆ ) / T ( ) Wh 1 ( 3 K 2 L 2 K 1
'
1 L θ θ θ σ − λ − = t ˆ ) / T ( ) Wh 1 ( 3 K 2 L 2 K 2
'
2 L θ θ θ σ − λ −  
       t ˆ T ) h W 1 ( 3
'
3 L σ − λ −   t ˆ ) / T )( ( W h 3 K 2 L 2 K 2 L 1 L
' θ θ θ λ + λ −  
t ˆ ) / T ( 3 K 2 L 2 K θ θ θ − = [( ) Wh 1 )(
'
2 2 L 1 1 L − σ λ + σ λ ) ( W h 2 L 1 L
' λ + λ + ] 
     ) / ( ) h W 1 ( 2 K 3 K 2 L 3
'
3 L θ θ θ σ − λ +  
[Note that  1 ˆL a =  − ) r ˆ W ˆ ( 1 1 K 1 − θ σ ;  2 ˆL a =  − σ2.θK2  (W ˆ −  2 ˆ r );  3 ˆL a = σ3.θK3. 2 ˆ r and σi = the 
elasticity of substitution between capital and labour in the i
th sector, i = 1, 2, 3.].  
 
Now, after using (A.1) it becomes 
2
'
2 L X ˆ ) Wh 1 ( − λ 3
'
3 L X ˆ ) h W 1 ( − λ +  
       ) / ( 3 2 2 K L K T θ θ θ − = [(( ) 1 )( ) /
'
2 2 1 1 1 Wh L K L − + σ λ θ σ λ ) ( W h 2 L 1 L
' λ + λ +  
           ) / ( ) h W 1 ( 2 K 3 K 2 L 3
'
3 L θ θ θ σ − λ + ] 1
'
1 L K ˆ ) Wh 1 ( − λ −                                            (12) 
 
After putting (12) and (11) in matrix notation one gets 
 
      ) Wh 1 (
'
2 L − λ            ) h W 1 (
'
3 L − λ       2 X ˆ          =     1
'
1 L K ˆ ) Wh 1 ( t ˆ A − λ − −                 (A.2) 
              2 K λ                               3 K λ                 3 X ˆ                            B 2 K ˆ t ˆ +  
 
where, A =  ) / T ( 3 K 2 L 2 K θ θ θ [( ) Wh 1 )( /
'
2 2 L 1 K 1 1 L − σ λ + θ σ λ ) ( W h 2 L 1 L
' λ + λ +  
                     ) / ( ) h W 1 ( 2 K 3 K 2 L 3
'
3 L θ θ θ σ − λ + ] 
and,  B = ( ) )( / T 3 3 L 3 K 2 2 K 3 K σ θ λ + σ λ θ  > 0. 
Solving (A.2) by Cramer’s rule one gets 






1 L 3 K K ˆ ) 1 Wh ( − λ λ 2 3 L
' K ˆ ) h W 1 ( λ − − 3 L 3 K B A { λ + λ − ( t ˆ )} h W 1
' − ]        (13) 
and,   18 




[(1 − W 2 2 L
' K ˆ ) h λ 1 L
') Wh 1 ( λ − + 1 2 K K ˆ λ t ˆ } A ) Wh 1 ( B { 2 K
'
2 L λ + − λ + ]       (14) 
where,  h λ = (1 −W 2 K 3 L
'
3 K 2 L




Differentiating (9) with respect to K1 one obtains 
(dY/d 1 K ) = W{ ) dK / dX ( a 1 1 1 L )} / ( 1 2 2 dK dX aL + ) dK / dX ( a W 1 3 3 L + ) / ( 1 3 3 dK dX tP −  
Using (4) and (13) the above expression can be rewritten as   
(dY/dK1)  = W[( ) 1 Wh ( a ) a / a
'






] ) Wh 1 ( a W
'
3 L − +
1 h






                                                                                                                    ) dK / dX ( tP 1 3 3 −  





) 1 Wh (
λ
− λ
+ h(.)[W ] W 3 L 2 K 3 K 2 L λ λ − λ λ ) dK / dX ( tP 1 3 3 −  




[W } ) h W 1 ( ) Wh 1 {( X a 2 K 3 L
'
3 K 2 L
'
1 1 L λ λ − − λ λ −                                                
                  }] W W { h ) 1 Wh ( 3 L 2 K 3 K 2 L
'
1 L λ λ − λ λ − λ + ) dK / dX ( tP 1 3 3 −  







[W 3 L 2 K
'
2 K 3 L
' ) 1 Wh ( W ) 1 h W ( λ λ − − λ λ − ] ) dK / dX ( tP 1 3 3 −  
or, (dY/dK1)  = 
1 h





( ) W W − ) dK / dX ( tP 1 3 3 −                                    
Now using (14) the above expression becomes 









( ) W W −  − (tP3.X3 /K1.λh) 1




Differentiating equation (9) the following expression can be obtained. 
dY = dW.(aL1.X1 + aL2.X2) + W.(aL1.dX1 + X1.daL1 + aL2.dX2 + X2.daL2) + W .(aL3.dX3 + X3.daL3)  
                                                                                                 + K1.dr1 + K2.dr2 − tP3.dX3  -P3X3dt 
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So 
Y.Y ˆ = [W ˆ .W.(aL1.X1 + aL2.X2) + W.aL1.X1.( 1 ˆ X + 1 ˆL a ) + W.aL2.X2.( 2 ˆ X +  2 ˆL a )  
                                   + W .aL3.X3.( 3 ˆ X  +  3 ˆL a ) + r1.K1. 1 ˆ r  + r2.K2. 2 ˆ r  − tP3.X3. 3 ˆ X - tP3X3tˆ ] 
        = [W.aL1.X1.{W ˆ +  1 ˆ X + 1 ˆL a } + W.aL2.X2.{ W ˆ + 2 ˆ X +  2 ˆL a } +W .aL3.X3. ( 3 ˆ X  +  3 ˆL a )] 
                                                              + r1.K1. 1 ˆ r  + r2.K2. 2 ˆ r  − tP3.X3. 3 ˆ X - tP3X3 tˆ              (A.3) 
Now using (4), (10), (13) and (14) 
(W ˆ +  1 ˆ X + 1 ˆL a ) = (T.θK2./θL2.θK3).[− 1 + (σ1/θK1)].tˆ                                            (A.4.1) 
(W ˆ + 2 ˆ X +  2 ˆL a ) = (T.θK2/θL2.θK3).(σ2 − 1).tˆ − {A.λK3 + B.λL3.(1−h′.W )}.(1/λh).tˆ          (A.4.2)     
and,  ( 3 ˆ X  +  3 ˆL a ) = σ3.T.tˆ + {A.λK2 + B.λL2.(1−h′.W)}.(1/λh).t ˆ                             (A.4.3) 
Using (A.4.1), (A.4.2) and (A.4.3) we may write 
[W.aL1.X1.{W ˆ +  1 ˆ X + 1 ˆL a } + W.aL2.X2.{W ˆ + 2 ˆ X +  2 ˆL a } +W .aL3.X3. ( 3 ˆ X  +  3 ˆL a )] 
            = h.T.t ˆ.[(λL1.θK2.W /θL2.θK3.θK1).(σ1 − θK1) + (W.λL2.θK2 /θL2.θK3).(σ2 −1) +W .λL3.σ3]  
                                 + t ˆ.(h /λh).[λL3.λL2.B.(W − W) + A.(W .λL3.λK2 − W.λL2.λK3)] 
            = (h.T.t ˆ/θL2.θK3.θK1).[W.θK2.{λL1.(σ1 − θK1) + λL2.θK1.(σ2 − 1)} + W .λL3.σ3.θL2.θK3.θK1]  
                           + t ˆ.(h /λh).[λL3.λL2.B.(W − W) + A.(W .λL3.λK2 − W.λL2.λK3)]                 (A.5) 
With the help of (A.3) and (A.5) and after putting the values of  1 ˆ r  and  2 ˆ r from (10) we write 
Y.Y ˆ = (h.T.t ˆ/θL2.θK3.θK1).[W.θK2.{λL1.(σ1 − θK1) + λL2.θK1.(σ2 − 1)} + W .λL3.σ3.θL2.θK3.θK1]  
                           + t ˆ.(h /λh).[λL3.λL2.B.(W − W) + A.(W .λL3.λK2 − W.λL2.λK3)]  
                +  (T/θK3).[(r1.K1.θL1.θK2/θK1.θL2) + r2.K2].t ˆ − (t.P3.X3/λh).[B.λL2.(1−Wh′) + A.λK2].tˆ  
                                                                                                                                        − tP3X3.tˆ          20 
     = (h.T.t ˆ/θL2.θK3.θK1).[W.θK2.{λL1.(σ1 − θK1) + λL2.θK1.(σ2 − 1)} + W .λL3.σ3.θL2.θK3.θK1] 
                + (T/θK3).[(r1.K1.θL1.θK2/θK1.θL2) + r2.K2].t ˆ  
             + t ˆ.(h /λh)[B.λL2.{λL3.(W − W) − (tP3.X3/h).(1−Wh′)} + A.{λK2.(W .λL3 − (tP3X3/h))  
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